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CHALLENGING IMPUNITY? THE FAILURE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA TO PROSECUTE 
PAUL KAGAME 
INTRODUCTION 
 genocide begins. A rebel group, organized and efficient, sweeps 
in to save a country from the atrocity but commits crimes them-
selves. The rebel leadership takes over and the commanders stay in con-
trol. All too familiar is the scenario in which those who purport to bring 
justice to post-conflict countries enjoy impunity by remaining in power. 
The doctrine of command responsibility in international criminal law1 
states that criminal liability may be imposed upon a military commander 
or civilian leader who has either participated in the commission of a 
crime or failed to prevent or punish criminal subordinates.2 This theory 
has been incorporated into the Statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),3 established to prosecute those responsible 
for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law during the 1994 massacres.4 Under Article 6.3 of the Statute, a supe-
                                                                                                                            
 1. International criminal law is generally described as a “body of law that assigns 
individual criminal responsibility for breaches of public international law” and derives 
from treaties, international customs, and general principles. RONALD C. SLYE & BETH 
VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 3–4 (Vicki Been et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 2. GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2009). 
 3. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, pmbl., Nov. 8, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1589 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens responsible for 
genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring 
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 
Id. 
 4. The Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 955 establishing 
the Court after it found that violations of international humanitarian law constituted a 
genocide and a threat “to international peace and security” within Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Id.; Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 
Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 502 (1996). The ICTR is 
located in Arusha, Tanzania. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx (last visit-
ed May 18, 2012). The Tribunal consists of: the Chambers and the Appeals Chamber; the 
Office of the Prosecutor, in charge of investigations and prosecutions; and the Registry, 
responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative support. Id. There are cur-
A
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rior is not exempt from criminal responsibility for crimes committed by 
their subordinates.5 Furthermore, criminal responsibility is not relieved 
by the official position, such as head of state, of an accused under Article 
6.2.6 Nevertheless, Paul Kagame,7 former leader of the Rwandan Patriot-
ic Front (“RPF,” later the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”))8 and cur-
rent President of the Republic of Rwanda, has not been prosecuted de-
spite evidence that soldiers under his command committed crimes 
against humanity.9 
                                                                                                                            
rently ten cases in progress, one awaiting trial, sixty-five completed cases (nineteen pend-
ing appeal and eight acquitted), and nine accuseds are still at large. Id. 
 5. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.3. 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal 
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpe-
trators thereof. 
Id. 
 6. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.2 (“The official position of any accused person, 
whether as head of state or government or as a responsible government official, shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”). 
 7. The current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, led the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(“RPF”) in 1994 when they entered Rwanda and ended the genocide. See generally 
COLIN M. WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA: POWER, GENOCIDE AND THE RWANDAN 
PATRIOTIC FRONT (2004). 
 8. The RPF (later the Rwandan Patriotic Army (“RPA”)) was a rebel group formed 
of mostly exiled Tutsi in Uganda following a wave of emigration in the 1960s after a 
tumultuous transition to Rwandan independence. The RPF’s goal was to repatriate and it  
attempted an attack on the Hutu dominated Rwanda in 1990 in which most of the RPF 
leadership was killed. See Cyrus Reed, Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Pat-
riotic Front, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 479 (1996). 
 9. Under Article 3 of the ICTR Statute on Crimes Against Humanity, the Tribunal 
has power to: 
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, 
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) 
Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment; (f) Torture; (g) Rape; (h) Per-
secutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) Other inhumane acts. 
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 3. To establish that crimes against humanity have oc-
curred, the prosecution must prove “there was a widespread or systematic attack against 
the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.” Prose-
cutor v. Théonest Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Judgment, ¶ 2165 (Dec. 18, 
2008). Evidence that the RPF committed crimes falling within this category are found in 
the “smoking gun” known as the Gersony Report, presented to the UNCHR on October 
11, 1994 and subsequently suppressed by the U.N. Summary of UNHCR Presentation 
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This Note explores the failure of the ICTR to indict Kagame despite its 
willingness to utilize command responsibility to prosecute criminals.10 
Prosecuting Kagame is a step toward challenging impunity that the ICTR 
must take before the end of its mandate.11 Failure to do so will impede 
the growth of criminal responsibility in international law while simulta-
neously allowing commanders, who, able to retain power in post-conflict 
governments, walk free despite having committed or failed to prevent the 
commission of some atrocious crimes. The evidence to support indicting 
Kagame is now stronger thanks to the accessibility of a previously sup-
pressed report12 that documented the crimes of the RPF as well as a re-
cently released United Nations (“UN”) report evincing crimes committed 
by the RPF in surrounding territories.13 With the vested use of command 
                                                                                                                            
before Commission of Experts: Prospects for Early Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees 
currently in Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, RWANDINFO (Oct. 10, 1994), 
http://rwandinfo.com/documents/Gersony_Report.pdf [hereinafter Gersony Report]. The 
report cites “systematic murders and persecution of the Hutu population.” Carla De Yca-
za, Victor’s Justice in War Crimes Tribunals: A Study of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal in Rwanda, 23 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 53, 57 (2010); see ALISON DES FORGES ET AL., 
LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 692–735 (Human Rights Watch, 
2d ed. 1999). 
 10. Bakone Justice Moloto, Command Responsibility in International Criminal Tri-
bunals, 3 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST 12 (2009). 
 11. The ICTR is striving to complete its mission by 2013. Judge Dennis Byron, Pres., 
ICTR, Address to the United Nations Security Council: Six-monthly Report on the Com-
pletion Strategy of the ICTR (Dec. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/.ictr.un.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1180. 
 12. Gersony Report, supra note 9. The report was initially suppressed and its exist-
ence denied. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 728–31. A UN cable to then Secretary-
General Kofi Annan addresses the controversy surrounding rumours of Gersony’s report 
and stating that Gersony had concluded that the massacres “could only have been part of 
a plan implemented as a policy from the highest echelons of the government” and that he 
had “staked his 25 year reputation on his conclusions.” U.N. Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda, Cable dated Oct. 14, 1994 from the Head of the Missions, Shaharyar Khan, to 
the U.N. Secretary-General (Oct. 14, 1994), available at 
http://webpages.charter.net/jabdmb/Gersony1.PDF. Additionally it expressed that Ka-
game was “furious with the accusations” and that the report had been made public with-
out authorization. Id. 
 13. The report was the result of a mapping exercise conducted by the UN after mass 
graves were discovered in the Congo in 2005. Off. of the High Comm’r for Human 
Rights [OHCHR], DRC: Mapping Human Rights Violations 1993-2003 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter DRC Mapping Report], available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/AfricaRegion/Pages/RDCProjetMapping.aspx. One 
of the objectives was to map the human rights atrocities that occurred from March 1993 
to June 2003. Id. The result was a 550-page report after over 1,500 documents were gath-
ered relating to human rights violations and over 1,200 witnesses were interviewed. Id. 
With regard to its implications for the case at hand, the ICTR’s temporal restrictions con-
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responsibility, this evidence has created the perfect opportunity not only 
for the Tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity that have been ne-
glected but also to demonstrate how a comprehensive application of 
command responsibility can be utilized effectively against a leader.14 
Part I of this Note will provide a background of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and the role of the RFP. Part II will explore the theory of com-
mand responsibility and its elements in international criminal law15 and 
how command liability16 has been utilized and defined vis-à-vis ICTR 
jurisprudence.17 With the aforementioned evidence, Part III will show 
how the doctrine of command responsibility can be an effective tool for 
prosecuting leaders via an application to Kagame. Failing to pursue the 
case would be an impediment to the growth of command responsibility 
for future criminal prosecution, as well as a failure to act in accordance 
with international criminal law and with the principles set forth in estab-
lishing the ICTR.18 
                                                                                                                            
fine the relevance of the report to those crimes occurring in the year 1994 but does pro-
vide jurisdiction over crimes committed in the neighboring States. ICTR Statute, supra 
note 3, pmbl. 
 14. Sean Libby, [D]effective Control: Problems Arising from the Application of Non-
Military Command Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 23 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 201, 205 (2009). 
 15. Additionally, the contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugosla-
via (“ICTY”), established to prosecute those responsible for war crimes committed in the 
Balkans in the 1990s and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), are mentioned. About 
the ICTY, ICTY-TIPY, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited Mar. 1, 
2012); About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter INT’L CRIM. 
CT.]. The ICC is the first permanent court of its kind. About the Court, supra. Established 
under the Rome Statute of 1998, it was set up to prosecute the most serious violations of 
international law of threat to the international community. Id. 
 16. Command responsibility and command liability are used interchangeably. 
 17. International criminal law has evolved “primarily though the decisions and judg-
ments of courts of law,” and the development of command responsibility is one such 
example of how principles in international humanitarian law develop through internation-
al institutions. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
 18. Resolution 955 expressed the desire to put an 
end to . . . crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons 
who are responsible for them, [c]onvinced that . . . the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law . . . would 
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace” after its determination that the situation in Rwanda con-
stituted a “threat to international peace and security. 
ICTR Statute, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5–7. 
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I. GENOCIDE AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT 
A.  Historical Context 
Rwanda’s political history is tumultuous and the events leading up to 
the genocide of 1994 are complex.19 Misconceptions and theories abound 
as to the exact reasons why relations between Tutsi and Hutu, the two 
main ethnic groups within Rwanda, resulted in genocide beyond com-
prehension. The result was not only the murder of 800,000 over the 
course of one hundred days but subsequent killings of perpetrators and 
victors alike.20 
The Rwandan Patriotic Front grew out of a turbulent history of ethnic 
tension and colonial persecution.21 Rwandans who fled the country in the 
early to mid-1900s to escape ethnic violence22 grew tired of persecution 
from hosting governments and started to organize.23 Two such Rwandans 
and members of the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity (“RANU”),24 
Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, founded a guerrilla group called the 
National Resistance Movement (“NRM”).25 Kagame became the head of 
military intelligence of the National Resistance Army (“NRA”), the mili-
                                                                                                                            
 19. Given the complex nature of the history and events that led up to the 1994 geno-
cide, this Note is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview but rather strives to 
provide the reader with a generalized background before delving into the more pressing 
issue of establishing the crimes of the RPF and the doctrine of command responsibility. 
 20. Crystal Faggart, U.N. Peacekeeping After Rwanda: Lessons Learned or Mistakes 
Forgotten?, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 495, 496 (2008). 
 21. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 31–64. 
 22. From the 1920s to the 1960s, the Belgian colonialists began to implement Tutsi in 
positions of power, aggravating already tense ethnic relations between Hutu and Tutsi 
and setting the scene for the future conflict. Independence from Belgium, gained in 1960, 
brought in a dominant Hutu party (the Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation Hutu or 
Paramehutu) leaving the Tutsi monarchy to flee from the “Hutu Revolution.” The number 
of those in exile in the countries surrounding Rwanda continued to grow and by the time 
the RPF was formed in the 1980s there were approximately 500,000 in exile. Mark A. 
Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic 
Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 555–57 (1998); see also Chi 
Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-
Genocide Rwanda, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 201, 204 (2005); DES FORGES ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 36–40. 
 23. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 557. 
 24. RANU was organized by those in exile in repose to the Rwandan monarchy and 
stood for the creation of a socialist state in Rwanda. Due to its leftist and controversial 
ideology, the leaders of the RANU movement took it underground. Reed, supra note 8, at 
484. 
 25. The guerrilla group was founded in part against the Ugandan regime of Obote, 
who accused Rwandans of supporting Amin’s rule in Uganda and attempted to increase 
anti-Rwandan sentiment to garner more support for himself. Id. at 483. 
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tary wing of the NRM.26 As the guerilla movement grew the name was 
changed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in an effort to consolidate the 
mission of its members.27 The underlying aspiration was to eventually 
secure a return to Rwanda.28 
The RPF’s first opportunity to attack Rwandan President Habyarimana, 
by whose hands many Tutsi had suffered discrimination, came in Octo-
ber 1990.29 The attack failed, and the resultant death of Rwigyema pro-
pelled Kagame into the leadership position of the RPF.30 In retaliation, 
Habyarimana violently persecuted thousands of Tutsi still living in 
Rwanda.31 The RPF continued an active resistance32 until the Arusha 
Peace Accords in 1993 attempted to bring about a power-share between 
the RPF and Habyarimana’s government. 33  Tenuous at best, 
Habyarimana perceived the peace agreement as more of a threat than a 
movement toward reconciliation and began to increase his military and 
train the youth wing of his political MRND (“Mouvement Révolution-
naire National pour le Développement”) party, forming the Interahamwe 
(meaning “those who attack/work together”).34 The underlying tensions 
broke when, on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana was shot 
down, killing the President and all on board.35 What ensued within hours 
                                                                                                                            
 26. Id. at 485. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 558. 
 30. Reed, supra note 8, at 489. At the time Kagame had been studying military com-
mand at Fort Leavenworth in the United States. See WAUGH, supra note 7, at 47–49. Hav-
ing suffered defeat, Kagame went about “reorganizing, retraining and recruiting his army, 
which he was rapidly to transform into a formidable fighting force.” Id. at 52. 
 31. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 558–59; DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 49; 
WAUGH, supra note 7, at 53. 
 32. Habyarimana’s regime was assisted by troops sent by the French. DES FORGES ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 118. 
 33. Mgbako, supra note 22, at 204. 
 34. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, RWANDA’S 
GENOCIDE: THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE 26 (2005). The RPF likewise did not believe 
the Arusha Accords would prove successful and so continued to enlist and train soldiers. 
DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 129. 
 35. Speculations abound as to Kagame’s and the RPF’s involvement in the crash of 
Habyarimana’s plane. See Peter Robinson, Can Rwandan President Kagame be Held 
Responsible at the ICTR for the Killing of President Habyarimana?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
981, 982–83 (2008). It is not the intention of this Note to imply that this charge be added 
to the allegations of crimes committed by the RPF under Kagame. Moreover, a French 
court recently overturned a previous ruling, appearing to now exonerate Kagame from 
involvement in the downing of the plane. John Irish, French Probe Exonerates Rwanda 
Leader in Genocide, REUTERS (Jan. 10, 2012), 
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and for the next one hundred days was the systematic slaughter of hun-
dreds of thousands of Tutsi and moderate Hutu.36 
B. The Crimes of the RPF 
Upon the death of President Habyarimana, the careful planning of 
those opposed to the Arusha Peace Accords began to unfold in a horrify-
ing genocide. 37  The army, newly trained Interahamwe, and ordinary 
neighbors began to turn on the Tutsi and moderate Hutu while the rest of 
the world and the UN peacekeeping forces38 in Rwanda stood by and 
watched.39 Presented not only with the murder of thousands of fellow 
Rwandans but a political opportunity, the RPF entered Rwanda and ad-
vanced towards Kigali.40 For fifteen weeks as the genocide unfolded at 
an alarming rate, the RPF moved into the country, gaining control of Ki-
gali in mid-July.41 The RPF quickly established a coalition government 
and appointed their commander, Kagame, as the Minister of Defense and 
Vice-President.42 By gaining control of Kigali and soon thereafter the 
remainder of Rwanda, the RPF ended the genocide.43 Thousands, fearing 
retaliatory killings with the RPF in power, fled into the surrounding 
countries.44 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/11/rwanda-genocide-report-
idINDEE80A00J20120111 
 36. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 180–221. 
 37. Reed, supra note 8, at 496. 
 38. The UN initially deployed about 1,300 peacekeepers after the Arusha Accords. 
UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was to monitor observance 
of the ceasefire and was under the command of Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, who fought 
unsuccessfully for additional UN troops to be sent Rwanda as the genocide began and the 
international community deserted the country. MOGHALU, supra note 34, at 18; see 
ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN 
RWANDA 289 (2003). 
 39. Reed, supra note 8, at 496–97. 
 40. Id. at 497. 
 41. Drumbl, supra note 22, at 563; WAUGH, supra note 7, at 67–74. 
 42. Reed, supra note 8, at 497; WAUGH, supra note 7, at 76. 
 43. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 13. 
 44. Most fled to Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Security Coun-
cil approved Operation Turquoise to deploy French Troops into Rwanda as the RPF ad-
vanced. It was estimated that as the RPF continued its attacks the number of internally 
replaced persons in the designated “safe zone” in Rwanda grew from 500,000 to over one 
million in a matter of days. Once victory was declared it was estimated that over 2.5 mil-
lion refugees had fled the country, mostly into Zaire. Jason A. Dzubow, The International 
Response to the Civil War in Rwanda, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 513, 516 (1994). The UN 
Mapping Report on the Congo puts the number of refugees that entered the Congo at 1.2 
million following the genocide. DRC Mapping Report, supra note 13, ¶ 131, at 50. 
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Evidence that crimes were committed by the RPF during their sweep 
into Rwanda and the subsequent weeks as they took control was first ex-
posed in a report submitted by Robert Gersony45 to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) on October 10, 1994.46 
Gersony headed a mission that was conducted over five weeks from Au-
gust to September of 1994 and consisted of over two hundred interviews 
in nine UNHCR refugee camps and at ninety-one locations within the 
country.47 The report cited evidence of “systematic and sustained killing 
and persecution of . . . civilian Hutu populations by the [RPF].”48 The 
killings were described as “indiscriminate killings against men, women, 
children, including the sick and the elderly” occurring at meetings held 
under the pretext of peace49 as well as during the pursuit of hidden popu-
lations and asylum seekers.50 There was an “unmistakable pattern of sys-
tematic [RPF] conduct”51 that resulted in “more than 5,000 but perhaps 
as many as 10,000 [deaths] per month.”52 Furthermore, the report cites 
evidence that in the Gisenyi prefecture53 there was a “systematic pattern 
of arbitrary arrests and the disappearances of adult males [and] . . . the 
execution of at least dozens of those arrested was credibly reported.”54 
The mission was short and only three prefectures were visited – but the 
evidence it accumulated strongly supports a case for crimes against hu-
                                                                                                                            
 45. Robert Gersony was sent by the UN Human Rights Commission to conduct an 
investigation into repatriation of refugees but he became increasingly convinced of RPF 
crimes and began to gather data that was then submitted in a report. DES FORGES ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 726. This report was then suppressed and its existence denied until re-
cently being leaked in September 2010. Id.; see Gersony Report, supra note 9. 
 46. According to DES FORGES ET AL., the report submitted by Gersony concluded “the 
RPF had engaged in widespread and systematic slaughter of unarmed civilians. In Sep-
tember 1994, the UN, in agreement with the U.S. . . .agreed to suppress the report but 
demanded that the RPF halt the killings.” DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 14. 
 47. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 1. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Des Forges states that RPF solders were responsible for massacring unarmed 
civilians, many of them women and children, including those who assembled for a meet-
ing at the request of the RPF. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 692–735. The people 
were told to come receive food or to be given instructions. Id. 
 50. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Of the eleven prefectures in Rwanda, Giseney is located in the far west of Rwan-
da bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) above Lake Kivu. Map 
of Rwanda, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/MapofRwanda/tabid/125/Default.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2012). 
 54. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 11. 
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manity.55 Reporting that RPF soldiers “killed dozens of political and mil-
itary leaders . . . family members, including women, and children in a 
number of these cases” in the early raids against Kigali,56 the report 
likewise included in its list of violence mass killings at meetings, door-
to-door killings, killing of asylum seekers, and killing of those who had 
begun to return.57 Amnesty International reported that “many of the kill-
ings took place in a series of arbitrary reprisals mainly against groups of 
Hutu civilians.”58 Other documents likewise acknowledged the reprisal 
killings, going so far as to posit that crimes against humanity were taking 
place.59 The conclusion of the Gersony Report is unequivocal: “an un-
mistakable pattern of systematic RPA conduct of such actions is the una-
voidable conclusion of the team’s interviews.”60 
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: ELEMENTS AND APPLICATION 
 
In order to effectively utilize command responsibility as a way of im-
posing liability upon Kagame for crimes committed by the RPF, it is 
necessary to understand the history and how individual elements of the 
doctrine have been interpreted and employed. Underlying the doctrine is 
an understanding that the laws of war sanction what would otherwise be 
murder and that subordinates, acting under the command of a superior, 
are freed from liability in the commission of such acts.61 The command-
                                                                                                                            
 55. Ycaza, supra note 9, at 58–59 states “[t]he numbers and hard evidence prove 
conclusively and decidedly favor prosecution of the RPF for these widespread and sys-
tematic killings. However, the discrepancies in opinions about the magnitude of the 
crimes have made it difficult to move forward with prosecution of RPF members for the 
crimes they committed.” (citing Okechuckwu Oko, The Challenges of International 
Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 343, 384–85 (2008)). 
 56. DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 14. 
 57. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 4–6. 
 58. Amnesty Int’l, Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandese 
Patriotic Army, AI Index AFR 47/016/94 (Oct. 14, 1994), available at  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/016/1994. The DRC Mapping report cites 
that the forces crossed the border to chase Hutu refugees. DRC Mapping Report, supra 
note 13, ¶ 193. 
 59. See Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the situation 
of human rights in Rwanda, ¶¶ 22, 54, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1995/7 (June 28, 1994) (by R. Degni-Ségui) stating not only that the RPF had 
been guilty of “summary executions” but that “the assassinations and other inhuman acts 
committed against the civilian population, like the acts of persecution for political mo-
tives combined with the war crimes, constitute crimes against humanity.” 
 60. Gersony Report, supra note 9, at 6. 
 61. Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility, 5 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 661–62 (2007). 
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er’s responsibility to lead—and, when crimes beyond those sanctioned 
by the laws of war are committed, prosecute—is intertwined with the 
subordinates’ privileged position.62  Thus, the responsibility to control 
subordinates and liability for failure to punish for crimes committed by 
them is justifiably placed upon the commander.63 
The emergence of modern-day command responsibility is customarily 
dated back to the U.S. Military Commission decision in the trial of Gen-
eral Tomoyuki Yamashita in 1945,64 which, while not the first to address 
the responsibility of commanders, remains a controversial decision in its 
utilization of the theory.65 Despite the contentious nature of the decision, 
it set precedent by recognizing that commanders had an affirmative duty 
to make sure that subordinates abided by the law and that failure to en-
sure such obedience could result in the commander being convicted.66 
From this controversial “beginning” through the Nuremburg Tribunals, 
set up to prosecute the senior German commanders post-WWII,67 and the 
Tokyo Tribunals, prosecuting the crimes of Japanese leaders during the 
                                                                                                                            
 62. Id. at 662. 
 63. Id.; HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND 
MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 89–90 (Michael Bohlander 
et al. eds., 2009). 
 64. Yamashita’s conviction appeared to be based on a mere unawareness that his 
troops in the Philippines were committing crimes and the military commission that was 
trying him famously said, 
It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because 
one of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where murder 
and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences, and there is 
no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, 
such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the law-
less actions of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances 
surrounding them. 
4 U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 35 (1948). The 
U.S. Supreme Court is considered to have then adopted this form of liability by denying 
Yamashita remedy after a habeas petition was brought. See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 
1 (1946). 
 65. The idea of commanders being held criminally responsible for the actions of his 
soldiers dates back to the times of Sun Tzu. James D. Levine II, The Doctrine of Com-
mand Responsibility and its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership: Does the Inter-
national Criminal Court have the Correct Standard, 193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 54–58 (2007); 
METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 5–8; Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for 
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1973); Beatrice I. Bonafé, Finding a Proper Role for 
Command Responsibility, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 599, 601 (2007). 
 66. Levine, supra note 65, at 59. 
 67. Id. at 60. 
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war,68 the growth of the doctrine stagnated until the creation of the ad 
hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (“ICTY”)69 and the ICTR, by the UN.70 This lull in development is 
largely attributed to the failure of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,71 
which, while codifying a majority of the international humanitarian laws, 
failed to comment on the doctrine, a misstep that delayed the doctrine’s 
wider acceptance.72 This error was later amended in Additional Protocol 
I of 1977 to the Geneva Convention, allowing the doctrine to be codified 
in part in the international law regime.73 
Established to bring post-conflict justice in their respective regions, the 
ad hoc Tribunals actively added to the development of command liability 
in their early years.74 Due to this initial enthusiasm, the Tribunals can 
now lay claim to the modern day interpretation and understanding of 
command responsibility.75 Both statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR ad-
dress and create criminal liability for commanders who failed to either 
prevent or punish perpetrators under their command.76 In Article 7.3 and 
Article 6.3, the respective statutes of the ICTY and ICTR lay out com-
mand responsibility in identical phrasing that a criminal act: 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of crim-
inal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the 
                                                                                                                            
 68. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“Tokyo Tribunal”) was es-
tablished mostly to address the mistreatment and security of prisoners of war. Matthew 
Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 8 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 17–18 (2001). 
 69. The ICTY was established to prosecute those responsible for war crimes commit-
ted in the Balkans in the 1990s. It began in 1993 to deal with crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes. About the ICTY, supra note 15. 
 70. Daniel Watt, Stepping Forward or Stumbling Back? Command Responsibility for 
Failure to Act, Civilian Superiors and the International Criminal Court, 17 DALHOUSIE J. 
LEGAL STUD. 141, 158 (2008). 
 71. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 set forth the core rules that form international 
humanitarian law, regulating conduct in war and specifically protecting those outside 
armed conflict. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 72. Levine, supra note 65, at 65. 
 73. Id. at 65, 68; Additional Protocol I laid forth that “The fact that a breach of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his 
superiors from penal disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had 
information.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 86.2, 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 74. See METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 12. 
 75. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 601. 
 76. Levine, supra note 65, at 72. 
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subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the su-
perior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.77 
In short, any “person exercising effective control over a number of 
subordinates is criminally liable under international law if he fails to pre-
vent or punish their crimes as long as the superior knew or had reason to 
know about such crimes.”78 The Tribunals have recognized three ele-
ments necessary to establish liability: 
i) the existence of a de jure or de facto superior—
subordinate relationship of effective control; 
ii) the superior knew or had reason to know that the 
criminal act was about to be or had been committed; 
iii) the superior failed to take the necessary steps to pre-
vent or punish the offences.79 
While straightforward in theory, numerous issues arise in the practical 
application of each doctrinal element.80 Consistent application was fur-
ther complicated at the ICTR due to an early decision that “the Chamber 
finds it appropriate to assess [the doctrine] on a case by case basis.”81 
Understanding how each element has come to be interpreted and applied 
at the ICTR and more generally in international criminal law will inform 
the manner in which the doctrine can be effectively used to prosecute 
Kagame. 
A. Establishing the Superior-Subordinate Relationship 
The key element fundamental to any attempt to establish liability under 
command responsibility is the link between the perpetrator and the supe-
rior. Without the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship the the-
                                                                                                                            
 77. ICTR Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.3; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7.3, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 78. Ilias Bantekas, On Stretching the Boundaries of Responsible Command, 7 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1197, 1197 (2009). 
 79. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 605; Martinez, supra note 61, at 642; Moloto, supra 
note 10, at 15–16. 
 80. Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F. 365, 366 (2003). 
 81. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 491 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
This approach made sense given the undeveloped state of the doctrine and the approach 
was reaffirmed in the case of Prosecutor v. Musema Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, 
¶ 135 (Jan. 27, 2000). 
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ory of command responsibility cannot be used.82 Within the classical mil-
itary structure, the relationship is clearly drawn. Complications arise 
when charges are brought against citizens, political leaders, and, more 
recently, the possible extension to guerrilla and terrorist leaders.83 Where 
military commanders oversaw or ordered the execution of illegal actions, 
accountability is easily justified due to their position of authority and 
clear delineation of control over their subordinates.84 Indirect command 
responsibility proves more ambiguous85 and it appears accepted that the 
designation of command does not have to be strictly formal in the mili-
tary sense, but is rather broken into individual elements of de jure86 and 
de facto87 control.88 Where the authority of nonmilitary leaders mimics a 
military-like structure, actions are easily placed within the scope of 
command responsibility; growth of the doctrine has now incorporated 
political and civilian leaders as well.89 
What is crucial to the application of command responsibility to the 
nonmilitary context—where the militaristic structure is not clearly mim-
icked—is the degree of authority that these citizens are found to have 
exercised over those who commissioned the crime.90 The Tribunals now 
apply the “effective control” test to see whether superiors had the “mate-
rial ability to prevent and punish”91 crimes committed.92 If this standard 
is not found, a superior will not incur liability under the theory of com-
mand responsibility.93 Because of the degree of difficulty in identifying 
the duties of civilian leaders, command responsibility is less frequently 
applied where other preferable forms of liability, such as joint criminal 
enterprise, are available and easier to establish.94 
                                                                                                                            
 82. How the relationship has come to be defined has grown but still at the core is 
necessity of some kind of relationship. Moloto, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 83. Williamson, supra note 80, at 368; Levine, supra note 65, at 80–82; see also Watt, 
supra note 70; Moloto, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
 84. Bonafé, supra note 65, at 603–04. 
 85. Martinez, supra note 61, at 639–40. 
 86. De jure meaning: “[e]xisting by right or according to law.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 194 (3d Pocket ed. 2006). 
 87. De facto is defined as: “[a]ctual, existing in fact; having effect even though not 
formally or legally recognized.” Id. at 187–88. 
 88. Levine, supra note 65, at 74; METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 138–39. 
 89. Moloto, supra note 10, at 16–17; Bonafé, supra note 65, at 604; METTRAUX, su-
pra note 2, at 102. 
 90. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 102. 
 91. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
 92. Moloto, supra note 10, at 17. 
 93. Id. 
 94. METTRAUX, supra note 2, at 107; OLÁSOLO, supra note 63, at 262. 
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The trial of The Prosecutor v. Kayishema illustrates how the ICTR has 
developed the de facto and de jure elements of the superior-subordinate 
relationship.95 As the acting prefect96 of Kibuye prefecture97 during the 
1994 genocide, Kayishema was considered the “highest local representa-
tive of the government,” but effectively remained a citizen.98 On trial for 
genocide stemming from massacres that occurred in local churches, a 
stadium, and the surrounding areas, the Tribunal sought to establish Kay-
ishema’s liability for initiating attacks and failing to subsequently pre-
vent or punish the crimes of others.99 In order to establish the superior-
subordinate relationship the ICTR found that, while the conflict at the 
time created a lawless state, within the prefecture, Kayishema had de jure 
control over the soldiers and officials responsible for the deaths and 
crimes committed during the genocide.100 Indeed, as a result of his re-
spective position, the Tribunal stated “[t]he Trial Chamber finds that it is 
beyond question that the prefect exercised de jure authority over these 
assailants.”101 The Chamber thus established a direct link by virtue of this 
position of the Accused over the bourgmestre102 (mayor) and the gen-
darmerie within the prefecture.103 
Finding evidence of the Accused’s de jure control, the ICTR proceeded 
to follow the steps of the ICTY’s Prosecutor v. Delalic (“Celebici”) and 
assess the existence of de facto control.104 The Celebici case concerned 
                                                                                                                            
 95. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 7 (May 21, 1999). 
 96. A mayoral-type position. 
 97. Kibuye is the most mid-western of Rwanda’s eleven prefectures. See Map of 
Rwanda, supra note 53. 
 98. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 7. Clement Kayishema became the Prefect 
of Kibuye commune on July 3, 1992. Counts 1–6 in the indictment lay out the grounds 
for Kayishema’s responsibility in genocide when Tutsis, seeking refuge in the Catholic 
Church in Kibuye were surrounded and massacred, resulting in the deaths of thousands. 
He was furthermore charged with initiating an attack against refugees hiding in the 
Kibuye stadium. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25–37. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 25–44. 
 100. Id. ¶ 479. 
 101. Id. ¶ 480. 
 102. Within the eleven Prefectures of Rwanda there are communes, led by the bourg-
mestre (effectively a mayor). The bourgmestres are appointed by the President and are in 
charge of the governmental functions within their respective communes. Alongside the 
Prefect (who is the highest local representative of the government in the Prefecture) the 
bourgmestres hold authority over the members of the army and Gendarmerie Nationale 
in their commune. The Gendarmerie Nationale is the armed forces lead by the Minister 
of Defense. Id. ¶¶ 7–11. 
 103. Id. ¶¶ 41–54. 
 104. Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for Genocide, 14 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 591, 603–04 (2001). In the Celebici case, a commander, his deputy, 
and a senior officer were charged with “willfully causing great suffering and serious inju-
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three prison guards being prosecuted for crimes committed within a pris-
on camp while they stood watch.105 The ICTY had posited a strict stand-
ard in which liability would be extended in cases where control mim-
icked that held by military commanders.106 However, in the case of Kay-
ishema at the ICTR, the Chamber used a less stringent analysis and 
found that de facto liability could be imposed upon civilians as: 
no legal or formal position of authority need exist between the accused 
and the perpetrators of the crimes. Rather, the influence that an individ-
ual exercises over the perpetrators of the crime may provide sufficient 
grounds for the imposition of command responsibility if it can be 
shown that such influence was used to order the commission of the 
crime.107 
However, in continuing its breakdown of de facto control, the ICTR 
then went on to posit that: 
[t]he mere existence of de jure power does not always necessitate the 
imposition of command responsibility. The culpability that this doc-
trine gives rise to must ultimately be predicated upon the power that the 
superior exercises over his subordinates in a given situation.108 
Thus the Chamber seems to suggest that while de jure alone cannot 
impute responsibility, de facto control could.109 The Tribunal found Kay-
ishema held control through a determination that, while his de facto au-
                                                                                                                            
ry . . . for their alleged acts and omissions as superiors.” Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, 
Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-T, Judgment, ch. II, ¶ 25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)). 
 105. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 1 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
 106.  
Accordingly, it is the Trial Chamber’s view that, in order for the principle of 
superior responsibility to be applicable, it is necessary that the superior have 
effective control over the persons committing the underlying violations of inter-
national humanitarian law, in the sense of having the material ability to pre-
vent and punish the commission of these offences. With the caveat that such au-
thority can have a de facto as well as a de jure character, the Trial Chamber ac-
cordingly shares the view expressed by the International Law Commission that 
the doctrine of superior responsibility extends to civilian superiors only to the 
extent that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is 
similar to that of military commanders. 
Id. ¶ 378 (emphasis added). 
 107. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 492 (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. ¶ 491. 
 109. Id.; Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F. 365, 369 (2003). 
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thority was less than his de jure control as the prefect during the geno-
cide, both branches of control still existed.110 
The question regarding the relationship between the superior and sub-
ordinate relies upon the degree of influence or control that the superior 
exercises.111 The “effective control” test112 appears in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, who was accused of genocide for acts commit-
ted in Mukingo commune of which he was the bourgmestre.113 Kajelijeli 
was convicted of direct and public incitement of genocide due to his 
presence at various mob sites and his participation in transporting mem-
bers of the Interahamwe.114 The Tribunal declared that there was enough 
evidence to establish that the Accused, who was likewise involved in the 
training and ordering of the Interahamwe, “held and maintained effective 
control” and was therefore liable under the theory of command responsi-
bility.115 
Authority in the case of Kajelijeli, who was a bourgmestre and had ex-
ercised his control over the military, was clearly delineated in compari-
son to the case of Prosecutor v. Musema.116 Addressing one of the big-
gest contentions in command responsibility, the extension of the doctrine 
to civilians, the ICTR found that Musema, as the manager of a tea facto-
ry, exercised both de jure and de facto control over the tea workers by 
virtue of his control over the finances and his ability to hire and fire the 
                                                                                                                            
 110. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, ¶ 25–44; Libby, supra note 14, at 218–19. 
 111. Williamson, supra note 80, at 370. 
 112. See supra pp. 697–98. 
 113. “The Appellant was bourgmestre of Mukingo Commune . . . As bourgmestre, he 
exercised important responsibilities at the commune level: he represented executive pow-
er, had authority over civil servants, and could request intervention by commune police 
forces.” Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 2 (May 23, 
2005); Libby, supra note 14, at 221. 
 114. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, ¶¶ 3–4. The Interahamwe were the youth 
group of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Revolu-
tionnaire National pour le Developpement, “MRND”). Beginning in 1992 the MRND 
began to provide them with military training and they were used extensively during the 
1994 massacres. See DES FORGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 4; see also supra pp. 689–91. 
 115. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, ¶ 609. The Accused was the bourgmestre of 
Mukingo Commune from 1988 to 1993 and then reappointed in June of 1994. As the 
bourgmestre he was found to have control over the locals and was thus accused of order-
ing, instigating, and aiding and abetting genocide and crimes against humanity. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 116. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment, ¶ 141 (Jan. 27, 2000). 
Alfred Musema was appointed the director of Gisovu Tea Factory in 1984. While the 
head office of the factory was in Kibuye, the Accused was responsible for both the 
Kibuye and Gokongoro prefectures. Id. ¶¶ 12–16. He was charged and then convicted for 
genocide. 
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workers at the factory.117 As his employees, their involvement in crimes 
relating to the genocide implicated Musema and made him liable under 
command responsibility for the commission of genocide.118 The Cham-
ber held that liability may be imposed, “be it de jure or merely de facto” 
control.119 This application of command responsibility has been criticized 
as lacking the necessary similarity to military authority in relying merely 
on the legal and financial power of a manager and is illustrative of the 
vacillating application of the doctrine.120 
The case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema exhibited a return to the mili-
tary-structure requirement advocated by the ICTY’s Celebici case and 
initially referred to at the ICTR in Kayishema.121 The Chamber stated 
that the doctrine would extend “to civilian superiors only to the extent 
that they exercise a degree of control over their subordinates which is 
similar to that of military commanders.”122 The case set forth a two-
pronged test, incorporating both “effective” control and the “material 
ability” to prevent and punish, to determine whether or not a civilian 
could be considered a superior.123 Ultimately, the analysis of the Trial 
Chamber held that any de facto authority had to be accompanied by some 
evidence of de jure authority.124 Chain of command, issuing orders, and 
                                                                                                                            
 117. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, ¶ 881. 
 118. Id. ¶ 893. 
 119. Id. at 7. 
 120. “[T]he ICTR conflated the ability to punish people for failing in their duties as 
employees with the power to punish someone for violent acts. It is unclear that Musema’s 
power to fire or reprimand his employees could reasonably be equated to the power to 
deter genocidal acts.” Libby, supra note 14, at 223; Williamson, supra note 80, at 372. 
 121. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 42 (June 7, 
2001); Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al., Case No. ICTY 96-21-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 493 (May 21, 1999). 
 122. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 42 (citing Delalic, et al., Case No. ICTY 
96-21-T); Williamson, supra note 80, at 372. 
 123. Williamson, supra note 80, at 372. 
 124. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, ¶ 43. 
According to the Trial Chamber in Celebici, for a civilian superior’s degree of 
control to be ‘similar to’ that of a military commander, the control over subor-
dinates must be ‘effective,’ and the superior must have the “‘material ability’ to 
prevent and punish any offences. Furthermore, the exercise of de fac-
to authority must be accompanied by ‘the trappings of the exercise of de ju-
re authority.’ The present Chamber concurs. The Chamber is of the view that 
these trappings of authority include, for example, awareness of a chain of 
command, the practice of issuing and obeying orders, and the expectation that 
insubordination may lead to disciplinary action. It is by these trappings that the 
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being accustomed to a following would all be used to evidence authorita-
tiveness that went beyond mere local popularity and followings.125 With-
out any de jure authority similar to that found in the military, a civilian 
would not be found liable.126 This more restrictive view was partially 
relaxed by the Appeals Chamber, which held that control is more than 
the mere existence of de jure authority.127 
The ICTR’s decision to tackle liability under command responsibility 
on a case-by-case basis has resulted in numerous interpretation discrep-
ancies of the elements. The extension of the doctrine beyond the military 
context further complicated its application, though for the most part the 
Tribunal has successfully employed its two-step test to determine the 
superior-subordinate relationship.128  What remains at the core for the 
principal element of command responsibility is a consideration depend-
ent not upon military status but upon “the degree and nature of authority 
and control wielded by the individual.”129 
 
B. The Requirement of Knowledge 
At what point should a commander have had reason to know his sub-
ordinates committed a crime in order to meet the requisite second ele-
ment of command responsibility—knowledge?130 The ICTY has recog-
nized that when arguing that a superior “had reason to know,” evidence 
must be given showing that there was specific information available to 
whomever was in charge.131 At the ICTR, the element has been incon-
                                                                                                                            
law distinguishes civilian superiors from mere rabble-rousers or other persons 
of influence. 
Id. ¶ 43. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Williamson, supra note 80, at 372. 
 127. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-A, ¶¶ 55, 62 (July 3, 2002). 
The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber had failed to appropriately consider de 
facto analysis and that control could not be limited to de jure. Id. ¶ 61; Williamson, supra 
note 80, at 373. 
 128. Libby, supra note 14, at 228; Williamson, supra note 81, at 372–73; Bonafé, su-
pra note 65, at 609. 
 129. Williamson, supra note 80, at 367 (citing Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, 
Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 216 (May 21, 1999)). 
 130. Levine, supra note 65, at 82. 
 131. JOHN E. ACKERMAN & EUGENE O’SULLIVAN, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 87 (2000) (“[A] su-
perior can be held criminally responsible only if some specific information was in fact 
available to him which would provide notice of offences committed by his subordi-
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sistently applied despite initially appearing in the Tribunal as a straight-
forward standard.132 Generally, the mens rea element133 does not result in 
strict liability.134 Circumstantial evidence of the crimes is an acceptable 
method to establish the requisite knowledge at the ICTR, including but 
not limited to: the number and type of acts, the troops involved, and the 
location of those accused at the time of commission.135 
Where a commander failed to obtain available information on an al-
leged crime, the question becomes whether this failure in and of itself 
should result in liability.136 Knowledge will not be presumed and thus 
any prosecution must provide evidence that the commander had access to 
evidence of his subordinates’ plans or acts and failed to take any ac-
tion.137 Accordingly, the element of knowledge in command responsibil-
ity falls somewhere between strict liability and negligence all the while 
creating liability for omission as well.138 It appears that despite the initial 
proposition of a strict standard, the actual application at the ICTR dis-
plays more flexibility.139 
The standard of “knew or had reason to know” under Article 6.3 of the 
ICTR was equated in Prosecutor v. Akayesu to “acquiescence or even 
malicious intent.”140 This initial high standard of knowledge has not been 
                                                                                                                            
nates.”) (citing Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, Landzo, Case No. IT 96-21-T, Judg-
ment, Ch. II, ¶ 393 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). 
 132. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 489 (Sept. 2, 1998); 
Libby, supra note 14, at 215–16. 
 133. A concept taken from domestic criminal law meaning the mental state of a crimi-
nal. 
 134. Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 44 
(Dec. 13, 2002). 
 135. Libby, supra note 14, at 213; Moloto, supra note 10, at 17–18. 
 136. Moloto, supra note 10, at 17–18; Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command 
Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 472 (2001) (“[N]egligent disregard of infor-
mation suffices for responsibility, major criminals can still be brought to justice: although 
their knowing participation in the wrongdoing cannot be proven, they can still be held on 
negligence grounds.”). 
 137. Levine, supra note 65, at 74. 
 138. Id. at 83. This remains true for the ICTY and the ICTR but here the ICC seems to 
show some development to the doctrine. The ICC statute differs from the Tribunal by 
broadening the knowledge requirement to “should have known” for military commanders, 
which would effectively make the evidentiary chain of liability easier to build. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 139. Williamson, supra note 80, at 379. 
 140. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 489 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
Jean-Paul Akayesu was the bourgmestre of the Taba commune and was charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and violating Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions. Id. ¶ 1.2; Libby, supra note 14, at 216. 
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consistently applied in practice.141 In most instances the mens rea ele-
ment must be established142 and underlying this is a debate as to whether 
the knowledge standard places a positive duty upon superiors to inform 
themselves of potential crimes or if it is sufficient that based on the con-
text of the relationship and crimes, knowledge can be imputed.143 The 
case of Prosecutor v. Bagilishema offers a detailed analysis of the requi-
site mens rea.144 The Chamber set forth that a superior 
possesses or will be imputed the mens rea required to incur criminal li-
ability where: he or she had actual knowledge, established through di-
rect or circumstantial evidence, that his or her subordinates were about 
to commit, were committing, or had committed a crime under the Stat-
utes; or, he or she had information which put him or her on notice of 
the risk of such offenses by indicating the need for additional investiga-
tion in order to ascertain whether such offenses were about to be com-
mitted.145 
The decision goes on to add that where the lack of knowledge is “the 
result of negligence in the discharge of the superior’s duties” criminal 
liability will be imposed as the superior should have known, echoing the 
“notice of the risk” seen above.146 This decision appears to significantly 
expand the “malicious intent” comparison that had come in Akayesu147 
and it is important to note that only one year prior, in Musema, the 
Chamber noted that the idea of “should have known” appeared too 
broad.148 
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The “should have known” standard relies upon the position of the su-
perior for consideration of the knowledge requirement. 149  Therefore 
where the superior had the means to obtain knowledge and failed, the 
fact that the superior was negligent in his duty could potentially impose 
liability by virtue of his position. This is far closer to an imposition of an 
affirmative duty upon the superior than before.150 However, despite the 
proposition of a broader mens rea standard, it appears that the ICTR 
tends to more closely follow the standard set forth by the ICTY where 
the superior will incur liability only if he or she were put on notice or if 
there was a deliberate refusal on the part of the superior to obtain more 
information.151 
C. The Failure to Prevent or Prosecute 
The third element of the doctrine imposes upon commanders a respon-
sibility to pursue and prosecute offenders once a crime has been commit-
ted and the offenses are known.152 This last element is made up of two 
distinct parts, either of which could arguably create liability; the first is 
the duty to prevent a crime if the superior is suspicious or aware that 
such crime could occur, and the second is the requirement to punish 
those who have committed a crime.153 The first measure entails a duty to 
investigate reported crimes and establish their veracity.154 If crimes are 
established, liability will be imposed, but only insofar as the commander 
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had the material ability to prosecute.155 The threshold test of materiality 
is whether or not the superior attempted to take “necessary and reasona-
ble measures,” a test dependent upon procurement of evidence.156 De-
spite theoretically having a standard from which to start, case law at the 
ICTR has not yet defined what “necessary and reasonable” entails.157 A 
mixture of the superior’s control and whether that control would have 
allowed the superior to prevent or punish the perpetration of the crime 
are elemental considerations.158 
One application of this third element at the ICTR is found in the case 
of Kayishema, where the Chamber held that: 
where the perpetrators of the massacres were found to be under the de 
jure or de facto control of Kayishema, and where the perpetrators 
committed the crimes pursuant to Kayishema’s orders, the Trial Cham-
ber is of the opinion that it is self-evident that the accused knew or had 
reason to know that the attacks were imminent and that he failed to 
take reasonable measures to prevent them. In such a case, the Trial 
Chamber need not examine further whether the accused failed to punish 
the perpetrators.159 
The ICTR dismissed any investigation into the Accused’s actions to 
mitigate violence based on allegations of his involvement in the perpetra-
tion of the crimes, thus setting a less-than-critical standard for the exami-
nation of a defendant’s actions in stopping or prosecuting crimes.160 Sim-
ilarly, in the Musema case, the Tribunal found that as the manager of the 
tea factory—not only knowing about but also having participated in the 
attacks himself—the Accused failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
steps to prevent or subsequently punish the crimes.161 By the ICTR’s rea-
soning, since the Accused had the ability to fire or hire employees, he 
also could have prevented or punished those committing the crime of 
genocide.162 This rationale has drawn the criticism that it equates the 
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ability to fire someone with the ability to deter genocide.163 Nevertheless, 
the Chamber’s reasoning in holding Musema liable under command re-
sponsibility was ultimately strengthened by evidence showing not only 
that the Accused had participated, but that he also acted as a leader dur-
ing the attacks.164 
Despite similar evidence to Musema, in the later Bagilishema case the 
Tribunal found that it was still insufficient to establish that presence at 
the scene of attacks was enough to incur liability.165 This finding could 
conceivably complicate the earlier analysis. However, it appears from the 
Judgment that the Tribunal took into consideration evidence that the Ac-
cused attempted to take some protective measures but lacked the re-
sources to deter attacks.166 The “Accused attempted to prevent Hutu from 
attacking Tutsi . . . the Chamber notes that . . . the Accused felt that he 
had insufficient resources.”167 The Chamber then weighed the lack of 
sufficient evidence of the Accused at the attacks against his attempted 
preventative actions, leaning in favor of no liability under the doctrine.168 
Alternatively, the Chamber may have found that issuing fake identity 
cards, falsifying resident registers and other acts on the part of the Ac-
cused may have been sufficient to satisfy the “reasonable and necessary” 
standard for preventing the commission of crimes.169 
Another aspect to consider for the failure to prevent or punish was also 
set forth in Bagilishema, where the Chamber found that where a superior 
“creates an environment of impunity,” criminal responsibility may be 
incurred.170 Following from Prosecutor v. Blaskic at the ICTY,171 the 
ICTR held that command responsibility for failure to punish “may be 
triggered by a broadly based pattern of conduct by a superior, which in 
effect encourages the commission of atrocities by his or her subordi-
nates.”172 Responsibility “may arise from . . . failure to create or sus-
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tain . . . an environment of discipline and respect for the law.”173 By al-
lowing subordinates the leeway to disrespect the law, the superior fails in 
the prevention of crimes and thereby can incur liability under command 
responsibility.174 This goes to the heart of Article 6.3, which the Chamber 
stated is “not that the crimes of subordinates should be punished but that 
superiors should ensure that the crimes do not occur.”175 Any analysis 
with regard to this extension would still be susceptible to evidence show-
ing that it may have been outside the superior’s material control to take 
the necessary steps to control the subordinates, thus avoiding liability. 
Nevertheless, it still demands that the superior create an environment in 
which subordinates are aware that crimes committed will not go unpun-
ished while similarly creating an incentive for superiors to maintain con-
trol and keep themselves informed of any potential violations.176 The last 
element of command responsibility thus requires of the superior a posi-
tive duty to act, either in preventing a perpetrator or pursuing and punish-
ing those who have committed the crime.177 
Despite the difficulties presented by each element of command respon-
sibility, the ICTR has helped create and undoubtedly strengthened a doc-
trine whereby a superior, whether in a position of power in the military, 
political, or social context, can be held criminally responsible for crimes 
committed by subordinates. Applying this doctrine on a case-by-case 
basis has resulted in a doctrine that, while at times inconsistent, has es-
tablished a foundation that can provide guidance for future prosecutions. 
Consequently, those found in a superior-subordinate relationship, who 
have knowledge or are in a position that requires their awareness of ac-
tions by subordinates, and who fail to take reasonable and necessary 
steps to prevent or punish, will incur liability at the hands of the Tribunal. 
So why did the ICTR fail to prosecute Paul Kagame? 
III. APPLICATION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY TO THE CASE OF 
KAGAME 
In order to establish that Kagame was responsible for the crimes com-
mitted by the RPF as their commander, the three requisite elements of 
command responsibility must be established. One must first prove the 
existence of his de jure or de facto relationship over members of the 
RPF; second, that he knew or had reason to know that the crimes were 
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committed; and lastly that he failed to take the necessary steps to prevent 
or punish the offenses.178 The ICTR’s case law has developed each of 
these elements sufficiently that when applying them together, the doc-
trine can be successfully applied in the case of Kagame. 
It would not be a hard stretch to find that Kagame, the highest-ranking 
military commander in the RPF, had de jure and de facto control over the 
members of the RPF. The standard set forth in the Kayishema case held 
that a civilian prefect had influence by virtue of his position over soldiers 
and officials in his prefecture.179 Likewise, the Kajelijeli case held that 
where the Accused had trained and commanded the Interahamwe, there 
was sufficient evidence establishing his effective control over the subor-
dinates.180 The purported return to the military structure requirement of 
responsibility in Bagilishema set forth the analysis wherein “effective 
control” and “material ability” to prevent and punish must be established 
in order for liability to be incurred.181 Therefore, to satisfy the requisite 
key element of a superior-subordinate relationship for liability under 
command responsibility, it must be established that the RPF was a mili-
tary-like structure and that Kagame, as the leader, held effective control 
with the material ability to prevent and or punish the crimes allegedly 
committed by the RPF. 
Kagame was the military leader of the RPF during the 1994 operation 
in Rwanda.182 The RPF, while a guerrilla group, closely mimicked a mili-
tary structure as evidenced by their command structure and militaristic 
organization, military success in taking over Rwanda, and subsequent 
transition to power in the post-genocide days.183 The RPF was “acknowl-
edged by military experts to be a highly disciplined force, with clear 
lines of command and adequate communication.”184 They had extensive 
communication “up and down the hierarchy” implying that the “com-
mander of [the] army must have known of and at least tolerated these 
practices.”185  Kagame, militarily-trained after his post as the head of 
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military intelligence in Uganda, had organized the RPF into an efficient 
force, as demonstrated by their quick attacks and organization while en-
tering Rwanda in 1994.186 With the well-documented evidence of Ka-
game as leader of the RPF and his command over the forces, there is cer-
tainly enough evidence to establish that a superior-subordinate relation-
ship existed between Kagame and the RPF troops to satisfy the first ele-
ment of command liability. 
The second consideration of command responsibility is the require-
ment of knowledge—that Kagame had knowledge that members of the 
RPF were committing crimes against humanity. During the genocide and 
in the months following, imputing knowledge of the crimes committed 
by RPF troops upon Kagame poses a challenge given the general disar-
ray of the country.187 Nevertheless, to address this element of knowledge, 
the requisite “knew or had reason to know” standard under Article 6.3 
can be established, as seen in the case of Bagilishema, through either 
direct or circumstantial evidence.188 In addition to the determination that 
Kagame was the leader of the RPF, the ICTR has shown itself willing to 
entertain circumstantial evidence that will infer knowledge.189 A superior 
will incur liability in situations where he or she was put on notice190 or 
where there was a deliberate refusal to obtain more information and the 
ICTR has purported to impose an affirmative duty upon those who would 
obtain information by virtue of their position alone.191 
It may be hard to concretely ascribe that Kagame had personal 
knowledge that the crimes were occurring. However, evidence exists that 
high-ranking officials within the RPF were aware.192 Seth Sendashonga, 
former RPF Minister of the Interior, has been quoted as saying that there 
was “an attempt at ‘social engineering on a vast, murderous scale’”193 
and estimated that tens of thousands of people were killed by the RPF.194 
Reports that “the crimes committed by RPF soldiers were so systematic 
and widespread and took place over so long a period of time” allow the 
inference that “commanding officers must have been aware of them.”195 
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Indeed, “the RPF itself . . . acknowledged these killings by Rwandan Pat-
riotic Army (‘RPA’) soldiers, although it described them as ‘isolated in-
cidents.’”196 The data collected by Human Rights Watch in the aftermath 
of the genocide led it to conclude that “RPF abuses occurred so often and 
in such similar ways that they must have been directed by officers at a 
high level of responsibility. It is likely that these patterns of abuses were 
known to and tolerated by the highest levels of command of the RPF 
forces.”197 It was also reported that Kagame had at the very least been 
informed about killings in the Byumba prefecture but did not inter-
vene.198 It is thus unlikely that Kagame, in light of his position, had no 
knowledge that any of these crimes were occurring.199 With the requisite 
standards in mind, it appears that there is enough evidence to sufficiently 
impart knowledge to Kagame, and while perhaps the ICTR would re-
quire further investigation to disallow any questionability, by virtue of 
the standard set forth in the Bagilishema case, what has been demonstrat-
ed may suffice. 
Having established the requisite superior-subordinate relationship and 
the mens rea of command responsibility, the duty to prevent or punish is 
the last element necessary for imposing liability. This duty poses an in-
teresting question. It is easy to see that during the calamity and chaos of 
the genocide, Kagame may not have been in a position to prevent the 
reprisal killings by his soldiers. But even if the duty to prevent goes un-
met, the duty to punish remains. Therefore, though encompassing two 
elements, failure in one element may still result in liability.200 The ICTR 
has taken a “necessary and reasonable” standard to begin any such de-
termination of liability and while no clear definition has been established, 
considerations of the superior’s control and the extent of that control are 
brought into play both for prevention and for the material ability to pun-
ish.201 Additionally, as in Bagilishema, liability may follow where there 
is evidence that an “environment of impunity” was created.202 Therefore, 
even though the RPF commanders may not have specifically given the 
orders, the evidence suggests that in most cases they did not halt the kill-
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ings or punish those responsible, thus creating a sense that the reprisal 
killings were acceptable.203 
The RPF was able to take Kigali and Kagame acquired an official posi-
tion of power very quickly.204 As the Vice President and Minister of De-
fense, Kagame hardly lacked the authority to prosecute, even less so as 
President of the Republic. Numerous promises to punish have been is-
sued by the Rwandan government, but little if any progress has been 
made.205 Despite several arrests and convictions of corporals and soldiers 
in connection with the RPF crimes,206 the small number of prosecutions 
suggests that a culture of impunity for the RPF victors was and has been 
established. For a time, this was attributable to the “non-existence of a 
genuine administrative structure” as one UN report stated.207 Neverthe-
less, it is now sixteen years later and there is little to show. With that re-
ality at hand, the third and last element of failing to prevent or punish in 
establishing command responsibility is satisfied. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of command responsibility is a critical prosecutorial tool 
in international criminal law. The combination of the doctrine of com-
mand responsibility and the evidence of RPF crimes committed under the 
leadership of Paul Kagame creates an opportunity to establish a clear and 
comprehensive precedent for this doctrine. Where before evidence was 
lacking and the doctrine was less cohesive, there is now a chance to pur-
sue justice. There is likewise a sense of urgency as the ICTR nears the 
end of its mandate and the window of opportunity begins to close. Prose-
cuting Kagame is important not only as a step to challenging impunity as 
the ICTR purports to do, but also to show how command responsibility 
can be an effective tool against future leaders who retain power. The 
necessary elements of the doctrine provide enough safeguards that those 
who may lack some elements of power and control will not get caught up 
in overzealous prosecution. Simultaneously, the doctrine ensures that 
those in command who commit or oversee the commission of crimes will 
not gain impunity by maintaining the position that gave them such capa-
bilities in the first place. 
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Despite enough evidence and a doctrine by which liability can be im-
posed, there is an unfortunate reality that must be addressed in any at-
tempt to prosecute Kagame. He is, after all, the current President of 
Rwanda and responsible for having led an army that ended a horrendous 
genocide. 208  The stability of the African Great Lakes region post-
genocide is often attributed to Kagame’s quick establishment of a gov-
ernment and order.209 Prosecuting a head of state poses its own challeng-
es and undeniably bringing a case against Kagame has the additional 
hurdle of international guilt when it comes to Rwanda.210 Though the 
ICTR has prosecutorial discretion, thus far RPF members have not been 
brought before the Tribunal.211 Criticism that the ICTR is merely pursu-
ing victor’s justice seems warranted when considering that, despite evi-
dence of crimes, members of the RPF are not being held accountable.212 
This would mean prosecuting some of the highest leaders in the current 
government, a situation clearly unfavorable to the Rwandan government 
and the international community.213 Arguments about regional stability, 
while persuasive, should not allow those who commit crimes to walk free, 
because “feeding the culture of impunity cannot foster peace and recon-
ciliation.”214 This is especially true when it comes to those in positions of 
power. Deference to a commander who was able to put an end to an atro-
cious genocide is commendable but not where it undermines the integrity 
of the international criminal justice system. 
Foregoing justice for those who fell victim to the actions of the RPF 
under Kagame’s command is too high a price and, despite his past com-
mendable acts, Kagame should be tried before the ICTR under command 
responsibility for crimes against humanity. Only then will justice be 
served. Likewise, in creating a stronger doctrine, future commanders 
who maintain positions of power in post-conflict situations will be put on 
notice. These future leaders will be subject to higher levels of scrutiny 
and increased likelihood of accountability for crimes committed under 
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their watch. With the perfect storm of evidence and doctrinal analysis, 
the ICTR has an opportunity to forcefully impact command responsibil-
ity in international criminal law that will endure beyond its mandate. 
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